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Plurality Competition and Party Realignment in Italy: 
The 1994 Parliamentary Elections
by Stefano Bartolini and Roberto D'Alimonte
On August 4, 1993 the Italian Parliament has approved the new 
electoral law for the Chamber and the Senate. The new law
marks a radical departure from the previous system of 
proportional representation which had been one of the main 
features of the Italian political system in the post-war 
period. According to the new system 3/4 of the seats in both 
branches of Parliament are allocated in single-member districts 
with the plurality formula. The remaining seats are assigned on 
a proportional basis. On March 26/27, 1994 the first
elections with the new rules were held, following the early 
dissolution of Parliament . This paper is about these
elections. Its main goal is to analyse in detail what has 
happened in the single-member districts. The focus is on the 
plurality component of the electoral system, the new patterns 
of competition, and the performance of the different electoral 
cartels. This analysis will be preceded, however, by a short 
account of the main features of the new electoral system, a 
description of the new political forces and alliances, and a 
general overview of the results at the national level.




























































































The new electoral rules were the outcome of a long political 
process marked by a referendum, the impact of corruption 
scandals and a complex set of political compromises 
(Pappalardo 1995). The new system is based on a complex mix of 
plurality and proportionality (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte 
1995). Moreover, there are significant differences between the 
Chamber and the Senate which , as we shall see later, are 
partially responsible for the different electoral results in 
these two branches. For the election of the 630 members of the 
Chamber of Deputies , Italy has been divided into 26 multi­
member constituencies , plus the small region of the Valle 
d'Aosta which has only one seat. In turn, each of these 
constituencies was divided into a number of single-member 
districts approximately equal to 75% of the seats assigned to 
them. The remaining 25% of the seats are allocated at the 
constituency level. Therefore in each constituency we find both 
n single-member districts and one multi-member district with 
m number of seats. The existence of these two different 
levels - the constituency and the district - is the direct 
result of the mixed nature of the system. In fact, in the 
single-member districts the electoral formula is plurality , 
whereas at the constituency level is a form of PR. In the 
Chamber 475 seats are assigned with the former method and 155 
with the latter. The same basic structure applies to the 
Senate. Here the plurality seats are 232 and the PR seats are 
83 with 20 regional constituencies ( but two of them - 




























































































for both branches, the PR constituencies and , for each 
constituency, the number of single-member (plurality)
districts.
(Table 1 about here)
The similarity between the electoral rules of the Chamber and 
the Senate stops here. Indeed, the two systems are
significantly different. The first difference has to do with 
ballot structure. In the Chamber, each voter has two ballots 
and can express two votes. One vote is for the selection of the 
candidates in the single-member district; the second vote goes 
to party lists for the PR seat allocation at the constituency 
level. This means, among other things, that voters may split 
their votes between the two levels, voting for a candidate of 
one party (or coalition) in the district and for the list 
of a different party at the PR level. In the Senate, instead, 
the ballot and the vote are one and the same. In other words, 
the same ballot will affect the allocation of both plurality 
and PR seats. Indeed, the candidates for both types of seats 
are the same. The PR seats are allocated to the "best losers" 
in the single-member districts. Not so in the Chamber, where 
parties are allowed to run ,at the PR level, a list of 
candidates which may or may not include candidates running 
also in the plurality arena.
The second difference has to do with the allocation of PR 




























































































step process. First, it occurs at the national level with 
the largest remainders method using the natural quota. 
However, only parties which get at least 4% of the valid 
votes nation-wide can get any PR seats. In the March 
elections 7 parties were able to overcome the threshold. The 
second stage involves the distribution of the seats allocated 
to each party to its lists in the different constituencies, on 
the basis of a 'constituency electoral quota'. For the Senate, 
the PR seats are assigned directly at the constituency level 
using the d'Hondt formula. There is no legal threshold such as 
the one for the Chamber. There is however a de facto threshold, 
which is generally high since it is influenced by the use of 
the d'Hondt method and the relatively small size of the 
constituencies ( with the exception of Lombardia). This means 
that it is usually difficult for small parties to get PR seats 
, unless they are regionally concentrated ( Chiaramonte 
1995).
The third, and most important difference, between the Chamber 
and the Senate is related to the scorporo. This is a peculiar 
feature of the Italian system. For both branches, parties are 
not allowed to use , towards the allocation of PR seats, all 
of the votes they actually get. They have to pay a "price" if 
they win seats in the single-member districts. The scorporo is 
such a price. The scorporo is calculated differently in the two 
branches. In the case of the Chamber, for each plurality 




























































































constituency level diminished by the number of votes (plus 
one) received by the second -placed candidate in the single 
member district where it has won the seat. Only the votes 
after the scorporo will be used to determine how many PR seats 
the party will eventually get. In the case of the Senate, the 
scorporo applies to all of the votes received by the winning 
candidate in each single member district. In other words, the 
usable PR votes of each party, in each constituency, are equal 
to the number of votes received by its losing candidates. 
Obviously, this makes the cost of the scorporo higher for the 
Senate than for the Chamber. In both branches the rationale 
for this mechanism is the same: the limitation of the 
disproportional effects of the plurality system for the purpose 
of giving minor parties the chance to get a few more PR seats 
than they would be able to gain without the scorporo.
Given the scope of this paper, we don' t need to expand 
further the analysis of the new electoral rules. What matters 
is to stress that the plurality component of the system has 
been very influential. The new rules have provided a strong 
institutional incentive towards electoral and party 
realignment. Before taking a closer look at the specific impact 
of the plurality system, we review briefly the actors of the 
changing party system in order to clarify the nature and the 
scope of the realignment.




























































































In the last few years the configuration of the party system 
has changed radically. Old parties have either transformed 
themselves or disappeared; new parties have entered the 
political arena. These changes have preceded the approval of 
the new electoral law. However, the new law itself , given its 
predominantly majoritarian component, has been a powerful 
factor of change. So, we can say that the evolution of the 
party system is the result of the interplay of the process of 
party de-alignment with the structure of opportunities and 
risks offered by the new electoral system. The process of party 
de-alignment dates back to the 80's. This is the time when new, 
and durable, political forces appeared on the scene - the 
Greens and the regional Leagues. The pace of change however 
accelerated dramatically with the emergence of two factors: the 
disintegration of communism and the judicial investigations 
which have exposed the network of corruption linking together 
some of the traditional political parties, businessmen and 
public administrators. We will refer to the latter factor as 
"tangentopoli" (bribe town).
These two factors have had a different impact on different 
actors. The first has affected directly and dramatically the 
major party of the left, the Italian Communist Party (PCI). 
Between November 1989 and February 1991 the PCI completed its 
transformation into the Party of the Democratic Left (PDS) 
(Ignazi 1992). In the process, a neo-communist party was 
formed: Rifondazione Comunista (RC). The effects of the




























































































and extend beyond the confines of the left. Anti-communism was 
one of the major - if not the major - factor of stabilisation 
of the Italian party system of the post-war period. Its 
systemic relevance helps explain to a great extent the position 
of dominance of Christian Democracy ( DC ) in that system . No 
wonder, then, if its melting away would cause a serious blow 
to that party.
In the case of the DC however the influence of the "communist 
factor" has been reinforced by the impact of tangentopoli. In 
fact, the judicial investigations have revealed the extensive 
corruption of the two major governmental parties: the DC and 
the Italian Socialist Party ( PSI). The combined effect of 
these two factors has been the virtual dismemberment of the 
PSI and the steep electoral and political decline of the DC. 
The results of every local election between 1992 (the first 
year of tangentopoli) and 1994 provide clear evidence of this 
phenomenon (Di Virgilio 1994). A similar pattern of judicial 
involvement and electoral decline has affected also the other 
minor centrist parties ( PRI, PSDI and PLI) which - off and on 
- had shared government responsibilities with the DC and PSI in 
the previous years. In sum, the old centrist coalition that 
governed Italy until 1992 was irreversibly weakened leaving a 
political vacuum in this area of the space of competition.
During 1993 the beneficiaries of the collapse of the centre 




























































































Nord (LN) of Mr. Bossi and the Movimento Sociale Italiano- 
Destra Nazionale ( MSI-DN) of Mr. Fini. The first party is the 
heir of the regional leagues which were formed in Northern 
Italy during the 80's. Its strength is concentrated only in 
this part of the country. Its platform is fundamentally 
moderate with a regionalist/federalist orientation (Diamanti 
1993). The MSI-DN has been the only party of the extreme 
right. Unlike the LN , it was a party with a national presence, 
though it got most of its support in the South. Its platform 
was inspired to a neo-fascist /nationalist ideology (Ignazi 
1989). In January 1994, it changed its name to MSI-Alleanza 
Nazionale 1 . These two parties had only two thing in common: 
both had never been in power; both had appeared and had been 
treated as "anti-system parties" before 1992. Therefore, both 
were able to capitalise after 1992 on their distance from the 
’old’ and 'corrupt' regime. The change of the electoral system 
- summer 1993 - accelerated further the process of de-alignment 
and recomposition. Its predominant plurality component forced 
parties and individual politicians to choose allies in order 
to be competitive in the single-member districts. At the same 
time, the existence of a quota of PR seats added to the 
complexity of party calculations about optimal political 
strategies.
In Table 2 we give a synthetic account of the transformation of 
traditional and new parties. For each party listed in the first 
column we indicate the new parties/groups that have originated 




























































































former members have joined. In this latter case we give the 
name of the leaders the have promoted the split/exit. The DC 
and the PSI are the two parties that have changed most. The 
Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) is the direct successor of the 
DC. Of the 5 other groups that exited from it, the Rete is a 
left wing formation created by Mr. Orlando along with former 
members of the PCI (Novelli). The Centro Cristiano Democratico 
is a moderate group that moved toward the right. The Popolari 
per la Riforma is the group created by Mr. Segni, the DC leader 
who became the champion of the movement for changing the old PR 
system by way of national referendums. Later on, this group 
turned into the Patto Segni, a coalition of catholic and lay 
associations/individuals. Other former DC members (Fiori, 
Selva) joined Alleanza Nazionale, a conservative group that 
associated with the MSI to form MSI-AN. The PSI shows a similar 
pattern of splintering. Before the creation of the new Partito 
Socialista (PS) (Del Turco), the party had already lost many of 
its members to Rinascita Socialista (RS) and Alleanza 
Democratica (AD) (both leftist groups) and to the Patto Segni 
(centrist).
(Table 2 about here)
The key factor in the recomposition of this fragmented picture 
is Mr. Berlusconi, the businessman and media-tycoon, who 
created in February 1994 a new and moderate political party - 
Forza Italia (FI) - and positioned it in the centre-right area 




























































































main actor in the process of structuring the new pattern of 
political competition. After weeks of hectic negotiations, 
following the early dissolution of Parliament and the opening 
of the electoral campaign, four electoral coalitions (or 
cartels) emerged as the competing actors. The immediate goal of 
these coalitions was to agree on the presentation of common 
candidates in the single-member districts. The agreement did 
not apply to the PR seats for the Chamber. Here each coalition 
partner was free to present its own list. All the major parties 
and many of the smaller ones took advantage of this 
opportunity (see Appendix A). From left to right, these 
coalitions were the Progressisti (PROG), Patto per l'ltalia 
(PI), Polo delle Liberta' (PL), Polo del Buon Governo (PBG) 
(see Table 3).
(Table 3 about here)
The Progressisti is the cartel of the left including 8 
parties/movements. Within it we find established parties such 
as the RC, PDS, PS, the Verdi and new formations such as the 
Rete, RS, AD and CS. The Patto per l'ltalia is a rassemblement 
of the centre bringing together the Partito Popolare Italiano 
(PPI) and the Patto Segni. The PL and PBG are Berlusconi's 
creations. His goal was the formation of a unified and strong 
moderate coalition against the left. In the pursuit of this 
goal he was constrained by two factors: the refusal of the PPI 




























































































refusal of LN to be in the same coalition with the MSI-AN. The 
first factor could not be removed. The second problem was dealt 
with successfully by Berlusconi through the expedient, 
accepted by his partners, of forming two different coalitions. 
In the North and Centre the Polo delle Libertà was the alliance 
of FI and LN (plus others, but not the MSI-AN). Here the MSI-AN 
ran competing candidates in the same districts. In the Southern 
districts, where the LN was anyway absent, the Berlusconi's 
coalition was made up by FI and MSI-AN (plus others). 
Therefore, FI was the common actor of the two centre-right 
coalitions. For what concerns PR seats FI, LN and MSI-AN have 
each run separate lists.
In terms of party system change, a further point to emphasise 
is the relevant systemic implication of Berlusconi's decision 
to incorporate MSI-AN in the mainstream of Italian politics. 
The end result is the re-legitimation of this party which was 
previously considered as an anti-system party without any 
coalition potential. The shift from PR to plurality and the 
steep electoral decline of the DC to the benefit of the MSI-AN 
in Southern Italy have provided powerful incentives for this 
strategy. Nevertheless, Berlusconi is the architect, though he 
found a very willing and capable ally in Fini, the young leader 
of the MSI-AN.
This is the structure of competition voters and parties faced 
in March 1994. The electoral coalitions were four, but, given 




























































































the basic competitive pattern in the plurality arena was 
tripolar. In most districts in fact the candidates with any 
chance of success were three: a Progressisti candidate, a 
candidate from the Patto and either a candidate from the PL (in 
the North and Centre) or a candidate from PBG (in the South). 
As we shall see later however this basic pattern gave way to a 
number of variations.
The Results
The plurality component of the electoral system has been a 
powerful factor in shaping the outcome of the elections. 
Berlusconi and his allies have emerged as the clear winners. 
However, they did not win equally in the two branches of 
Parliament. The electoral system has produced a divided 
Parliament, with a clear centre-right majority in the House, 
but leaving Berlusconi and his allies just short of a majority 
in the Senate. This has been one of the most surprising results 
of the elections.
(Table 4 about here)
Actually, without the proportional component, the plurality 
system would have yielded clear majorities both in the Chamber 
and in the Senate (Table 4). Yet, the outcome has been decided 
in the plurality arena. These elections have been majoritarian 
elections. The very difference between the Chamber and the




























































































proportional component of the electoral system, but much more 
in the different outcome of the plurality competition in the 
two branches. The Progressisti have been more competitive in 
the Senate. This is the reason of the divided Parliament .
(Table 5 about here)
Let's proceed step by step looking first at the PR results for 
the Chamber in 1994 (list votes) comparing them with the 1987 
and 1992 figures (Table 5). The data lend themselves to four 
basic observations:
1) FI turned out to be the largest party in spite of the fact 
that it did not exist just two months before the elections;
2) the PPI and the Patto Segni have lost almost 20% of the 
electorate compared to 1987 and have picked up about half of 
the Dc vote in 1992;
3) the MSI-AN almost tripled its vote compared to 1987-1992;
4) the left represented by the PDS and RC stands more or less 
where the PCI was in 1987 before its transformation; for these 
two parties, and particularly for the PDS, the 1994 elections 
marked an electoral come back compared to 1992.
In sum, the PR results reveal a clear tripolar electoral 
alignment markedly skewed towards the right. In fact, the 
combined strength of Lista Pannella, Lega Nord, Fi and MSI-AN 
(they all belong to the two Berlusconi's coalitions) amounts to 
46.4% of the valid votes. The left (including PDS, RC, Rete, 
Verdi, AS and PS) stands at 34.4%. The centre (PPI and Patto 




























































































The plurality results show a radically different pattern: from 
tripolar into an outright bipolar one, with the Patto per 
1' Italia receiving only 0.8 % of the seats in the Chamber and 
1.2% in the Senate. The following points emerge looking at 
Table 4:
1. Both in the Chamber and in the Senate the Poli (PL, PBG and 
their variants) have received the absolute majority of the 
single-member seats: 63.6% in the Chamber and 55.2 in the 
Senate. But the PR component of the system has compensated this 
outcome in such a way that in the Senate the absolute majority 
of the single-member seats has become a minority (though by 
little) of the total seats 2 .
2. The Patto per 1'Italia has been absolutely non-competitive 
in the plurality arena both in the Chamber (4 seats) and in the 
Senate (3), and it owes its parliamentary survival to the PR 
component, that was more marked in the Senate compared to the 
Chamber because of the different impact of the scorporo.
3. The Progressisti have done poorly in both branches. However, 
their performance in the Senate has been considerably better 
than in the Chamber. In the plurality arena they have managed 
to get 41.4% of the seats vis-a'-vis the 34.5% of the Chamber . 
For the Progressisti, the PR component had a neutral effect 
since the percentage of PR seats in both branches is basically 
the same and roughly approaches the percentage of votes of the 




























































































At the level of the electoral coalitions, the plurality system 
yielded a basically bipolar outcome. Obviously this does not 
mean that this 'cartel bi-polarism' correspond to a two-party 
format. On the contrary, party fragmentation is high, and this 
is not only due to the existence of the PR arena, but also to 
the electoral strategy followed by all parties. This strategy 
was aimed at the formation of electoral cartels based on the 
proportional allotment of candidacies among the allies ( 
D'Alimonte 94, Di Virgilio 95). Therefore, the expected effects 
of the plurality system upon party system fragmentation have 
developed at the level of each single-member district, but not 
at the national level. Excluding minor lists, we find in both 
branches more than 10 parties /movements (see Table A and B in 
the Appendix).
The competition in the single-member districts has been greatly 
affected by the persistent skewed territorial distribution of 
the electoral support for the main ideological families. The 
territorial concentration of the vote for the left in Central 
Italy, for the Lega in Northern Italy and for the MSI-AN in 
Southern Italy has reinforced the disproportional effects of 
the plurality system. This explains the astonishing success of 
the PL in the North and particularly in the Northeast and that 
of the Progressisti in the Central regions of the historical 
'red-belt'. Excluding the Emilia-Romagna, the Progressisti got 
only 14 plurality seats out of 180 in the North, of which only 
2 East of the Ticino river. Conversely, Lega Nord, Forza 




























































































'red-belt'. In the Senate the picture is basically the same; if 
anything the right coalition has done even worst in the Central 
regions (just one Senator!). In conclusion, the country is 
divided into three areas, two of which are entirely non 
competitive (North and Centre) and one which is highly 
competitive (the South) ‘ . This profound territorialisation 
enhanced by the majority system - has overshadowed any 
potential impact of a candidate oriented vote in spite of the 
personalisation induced by the use of single-member districts. 
In other words, the personality of the candidates has played no 
or little role in this first round of majoritarian elections. 
This explains at least partially the absence of variance at the 
district level in two out of the three areas of the country. 
One should expect that in the long run, were the logic of the 
plurality system to prevail, the variance among these areas 
will diminish and the variance within each area will increase.
The results of these elections will be approached in this essay 
by looking at four dimensions of analysis of plurality 
competition: 1) the closeness of district contests; 2) the role 
of fragmentation both on the supply and demand side; 3) the 
different patterns of competition ; and 4) the cohesion of the 
cartels. These four dimensions are not independent one from the 
other, but they interact with each other (particularly the 
first three) and moreover they are all affected by the fore 
mentioned uneven territorial distribution of electoral support 
for the major parties. For these reasons we will deal with each 




























































































relationships and the role of territorial and branch 
differences within each of them. In sum, we will investigate 
how the given electoral preferences combined with the features 
of the electoral system to determine the outcome of a divided 
Parliament 5 .
The Closeness of District Competition
In a plurality contest competitive candidates are those who win 
and those who, though loosing, come close to the winner. The 
distance between the first two candidates is therefore the key 
indicator of the level of competitiveness. However, it makes a 
difference which is the winning threshold, that is the minimum 
percentage of votes necessary to get a seat in each district. 
For this reason , before discussing competitiveness, we will 
analyse in detail the distribution of winning thresholds.
(Table 6 about here)
In Table 6 the mean winning thresholds are reported by branch 
and area . The differences between the Chamber and the Senate 
and between the geographic areas come out very clearly. In all 
the areas victories are obtained in the Chamber with a 
percentage of votes higher than in the Senate. At the national 
level, the difference is 7%. On average, the deputies of the 
North and the Centre have obtained their seats with about 50% 
of the votes. In a two-party system this would be a normal 




























































































this figure is surprisingly high. The more so if one considers 
that in the North the senators get their seats with an 
average vote of 39 %. This makes for a difference of about 11 
% between the two branches. As far as the regional differences 
are concerned, the winning thresholds for the Chamber diminish 
constantly from the North to the South. This is not the case 
for the Senate: the winning threshold in the Centre is by far 
higher than in other areas.
(Table 7 about here )
Further information on the winning thresholds by area can be 
found in Table 7 where the winners are regrouped by class of 
plurality. The frequencies in this Table show that in the 
Chamber, in about one third of the districts (32.5%) winners 
have obtained the absolute majority of votes. Of these more 
than half are in the North (90/154). Here we even find 20 
candidates who got more than 60 % of the votes. On the 
contrary, in the Senate the absolute majority is achieved only 
in 6.9% of the districts. Of these, 12 are in the Centre and 
only 3 in the North. If we consider the last class , we can see 
that in the Chamber only 12.4 % of the seats (59/475) have been 
gained with less than 35% of the votes. Of these, the 
overwhelming majority is in the South (52/59) and only four in 
the North. In the Senate, the percentage of seats with low 
winning threshold is considerably higher (31.9%) and it is also 
higher the percentage of those located in the North (19/74). 




























































































terms of the percentage of seats which are won with a low 
threshold (less than 35 %) is markedly higher in the Senate 
than in the Chamber and markedly higher in the South than in 
the North and the Centre.
(Table 8 about here)
To complete this section on winning thresholds, we need to look 
at the same phenomenon from the point of view of the coalition 
affiliation of the winning candidates. In Table 8 the mean 
percentage of votes of district winners by electoral cartel is 
reported. From it we can draw the following observations:
1. The systematic difference between the Chamber and the Senate 
is confirmed for all cartels (the only exception concerns the 
candidates of the Patto per l'Italia).
2. The Progressisti win their seats in the Chamber with an 
average vote lower than the general average, whereas in the 
Senate the contrary is true.
3. The Polo delle Libertà and the Polo del Buon Governo have a 
much higher vote in the Chamber than in the Senate. For the 
Polo delle Libertà the difference is higher than 10%; for the 
Polo del Buon Governo is about 8%.
4. The candidates of the Patto and those of Forza Italia and 
MSI-Alleanza Nazionale when not allied win their seats with low 
percentages of votes.
In conclusion, let's fix three important points: 1) the 
majority of seats won with low vote percentages (less than 




























































































seats in the Chamber is won by the Progressisti; 3) in the 
Senate the Progressisti and the two Poli split them evenly 6 .
(Table 9 about here )
After this discussion of the winning threshold, we now move to 
the main indicator of competitiveness: the difference in vote 
percentages between the first and the second placed candidate. 
In Table 9 we have classified all plurality contests on the 
basis of this indicator. In the first class, that of marginal 
districts, fall all those races where the distance between the 
winner and the runner up is lower or equal to 8% of the valid 
votes. It goes without saying that the choice of such figure is 
to a large extent arbitrary, although in our case the choice of 
a slightly different threshold (say 6 or 10%) does not modify 
the substance of the comment. What is more important, however, 
is that the empirical definition of electoral marginality is 
dependent on the general volatility level of each election. A 
difference of votes below 8% represents a safe margin in cases 
and periods of low volatility, while a difference even 
considerably higher can be insufficient in case of high 
volatility. So the empirical definition of seats marginality 
need to be temporally and nationally contestualised. For this 
reason great caution is necessary in the use of concepts such 
as electoral marginality and competitive seats, particularly 
when - as for the Italian 1994 elections - no comparison with 




























































































electorates to modify their previous vote orientations. 
However, we feel that the identification of marginal seats is 
important for two main reasons: a) a high number of marginal 
districts indicates - coeteris paribus - a higher degree of 
electoral uncertainty and competitiveness; 2) a high relative 
percentage of marginal seats won by a given party or cartel are 
an indicator of electoral vulnerability. Parties that win many 
marginal seats are potentially subject to considerable future 
losses as a consequence of even minor swings of votes.
All the other seats where the distance between the winner and 
the runner up is higher than 8% are defined as less 
competitive. We have operated a further distinction between 
safe seats, where the distance is between 8 and 32% of the 
votes, and fortress seats, where the distance exceeds 32%. The 
data reported in Table 9 gives the idea of a very limited 
competitiveness in the plurality arena. Throughout the country 
less than one third of the seats con be regarded as 
'competitive'. One every 8 seats is a fortress seat, out of 
reach for any opposition. In the Centre, one seat every four is 
of this kind. In the country, as well as in any of its 
geographical areas and branches (only exception the Senate in 
the South) the absolute majority of seats is represented by 
safe seats.
Within the context of a generally low level of competitiveness, 




























































































differences. Let's look at this aspect with particular 
reference to the marginal sets. For this reason in Table 9 we 
have added, next to the number of marginal seats, their 
percentage by area (row %) and their percentage within each 
area (column %) (see Table 9). Marginal seats are 138 in the 
Chamber and 90 in the Senate: respectively 29% and 38.8% of the 
total of each branch. The Senate results by far more 
competitive than the Chamber. A difference of 10 percentage 
points is not a minor one, particularly if one considers that a 
quota of the marginal seats in the Chamber is due to the 
divorce between Forza Italia and MSI-AN in several Southern 
districts, a situation which did not occurred in the Senate. 
From the point of view of their geographical distribution, the 
majority of the marginal seats is in the South, as expected. 
Both in the Chamber and in the Senate, marginal seats represent 
more than half the districts of this area (respectively 50.7 
and 67.6%) and in both cases the Southern marginal seats 
represent an almost identical percentage (79 and 78.9%) of all 
competitive districts of the country. These figures confirm 
once again that the South has been the only area really in 
competition in the March elections. On the contrary, the Centre 
is the less competitive area: in the Senate only one marginal 
district and in the Chamber only seven. Summing up, the 
electoral outcome was determined in the South, and particularly 
in the Senate Southern districts. In fact, the 71 marginal 
seats of this branch in the South represent not only, as we 




























































































also 30.6 % of all districts of the Senate. Even a small vote 
difference in this area and branch would have modified 
significantly the parliamentary outcome of these elections.
The last point to be investigated is the partisan orientation 
of the marginal seat winners. The right wing Poli have won the 
majority of these seats (56.5% in the Chamber and 54.4% in the 
Senate). However, these victories are relatively fewer than in 
the total of all seats. The Progressisti obtain a good 
percentage of the marginal seats: 40.6 and 43.3% in the Chamber 
and in the Senate. These percentages are higher than those the 
Progressisti obtain over the total of all seats. This 
performance allows them to re-equilibrate their parliamentary 
position in both branches. So, in conclusion, the marginal 
seats contests are more favourable to the Progressisti than to 
the Poli, and the former 'depend' upon these seats more than 
the latter.
Once gain the data concerning the South senatorial districts 
offer the best description of the differential outcome in the 
two chambers. The Progressisti have won altogether 96 plurality 
seats in the Senate. Of these 4 8 are in the South and 32 of 
them (that is the two thirds) are marginal seats. On the whole 
the Progressisti have won the 45.1% of the marginal seats in 
the South, against 52.1% for the right coalitions. This 
positive result testifies both the competitiveness of the left 
in the South and, at the same time, its electoral 




























































































these districts with low vote percentages, facing a right often 
internally divided, seems to suggest that vulnerability is a 
more realistic assessment of the prospects for the left in the 
South.
Having completed the descriptive analysis of electoral 
competitiveness, we turn now to the discussion of the factors 
that explain it. In particular the key questions are: why the 
high territorial and branch differentiation in the levels of 
competitiveness and why the left did better in the Senate 
generally and in the South particularly. Given that in this 
article we limit our analysis to the structure of the 
competition (leaving aside what concerns directly the overall 
strength of the parties) the following sections deal with 1) 
the number of candidates, 2) the level of concentration of the 
vote, 3) the basic patterns of competition and 4) the 
comparative electoral performance of candidates and their 
cartels.
The fragmentation on the supply-side: the number of candidates
The introduction of the majority system has not produced a 
radical reduction of the number of candidates, as one might 
have expected. Quite the contrary, as compared with the 
previous PR elections, the new system fostered a multiplication 
of candidacies. Most of them had very little or no chance of 
victory, even though their presence was by no means irrelevant 




























































































distribution of districts according to the number of 
candidates. What strikes is obviously the high number of 
competing candidate, by far excessive for a plurality formula. 
The average number of candidates per district is higher in the 
Senate (6.3) than in the Chamber (4.5). In 44 senatorial 
districts we find the incredible figure of 9 candidates. Only 
two contests of this kind exist in the Chamber. In the Senate, 
66.8% of the districts is contested by more than 5 candidates; 
in the Chamber these seats amount only to 13.9%. In the 
senatorial districts the candidate proliferation is higher in 
the North than in the South, whereas in the Chamber the 
contrary is true.
(Table 10 about here)
What are the reasons for these marked differences. In our 
opinion the phenomenon is largely the result of the different 
incentives offered by the new electoral law in the two 
branches. A considerable number of candidates has preferred to 
run for the Senate because of a number of advantages for 
'minor' candidates, and particularly for those linked to 
parties and/or movements with a strong local or regional basis. 
For each potential candidate, the choice where to present 
itself is influenced by three different factors which 
constitute the structure of incentives of any electoral system: 
1) the qualifications required for running (signatures, 




























































































for the seat allocation; 3) the rules for access to public 
funds. In the Italian elections of 1994 these three factors 
were so structured.
First, only in the Senate it was possible to stand as 
'individual candidates' without any linkage with parties or 
cartels. On the contrary, in the Chamber the link with a list 
participating to the proportional distribution of seats was 
compulsory independently of the will of the candidate to 
participate to the proportional seats component. This 
difference implied a higher organisational burden for the 
candidates of the Chamber. Among other things, they were 
compelled to collect both the signature for their candidacy in 
the district and the signature for the presentation of the list 
in the regional proportional constituency. Second, the formula 
for the distribution of the proportional seats is more 
favourable toward the local/regional parties in the Senate than 
in the Chamber. In the Chamber representation is conditional to 
the overcoming of a 4% threshold at the national level. On the 
contrary, for the Senate the electoral thresholds is not set a 
priori by the electoral law, but it results from the 
application at the regional constituency level of the d ’Hondt 
method7 . For a locally bases party or movement such a 
threshold is unquestionably easier to overcome that the 
national 4% of the votes for the Chamber. The fact that the 
Lega Alpina Lombarda - a sub-regional movement - had managed 




























































































this case. Third, in order to get access to the public finance 
for the Senate it is sufficient for an individual candidate to 
have achieved the 15% of the votes in the district and for a 
group of candidates to have managed to elect at least one 
candidate in the district or to have obtained the 5% of the 
valid votes in the region. Even in this case, the requirement 
for the Chamber are considerably more costly: the 4% of the 
votes at the national level. This threshold is lowered to the 
3% if the party in question has managed to elect district 
candidate.
The sum of these incentives (and the second in particular) 
provide a strong explanation of the different fragmentation of 
the two branches 8 . They do not explain, of course, why the 
average number of senatorial candidate is 7.8 (with heights of 
9.1 in Lombardia and 8.7 in Piemonte) in the North and of 5.5 
in the South. This explanation lies in environmental aspects 
interacting with the structure of incentives offered by the 
electoral law.
(Figure 1 about here)
The explanation of the higher fragmentation of the Senate 
candidacies was necessary but in this context we are primarily 
interested in using it as an independent variable; that is, to 
investigate whether such fragmentation of the supply has 
influenced the electoral results, and particularly the level of 




























































































cartel. For the Chamber the relation between candidacies 
fragmentation and winning threshold is negative. The latter 
declines when the number of candidates increases. In the 
Senate, on the contrary , no relationship exists between these 
two variables (see Figure 1) . The distance between the first 
two candidates is in no way correlated with the number of 
competing candidates neither in the Chamber nor in the Senate. 
Over 700 plurality seats in the two branches, those with 9 or 
10 candidates show a mean distance higher than in the districts 
with a lower number of candidates. In the Senate, the most 
competitive races (those with the lowest distance) are found in 
the districts with 4 candidates, and also in the districts with 
8. Only for the Chamber there are signs of a decline of the 
electoral distance (and therefore of increasing 
competitiveness) when the fragmentation increases. But these 
are, indeed, only weak signs.
At first sight it seems that candidacies fragmentation and 
competitiveness are not related. However, the fragmentation in 
the Senate is greater than in the Chamber, the winning 
threshold and the electoral distance between the first two 
candidates in the Senate are lower, the left wins more in the 
Senate. All this seems to suggest that the better performance 
of the left in the Senate is due to its higher fragmentation. 
If this were the case one should find a positive correlation 
between the left victories and the level of fragmentation. But 
it is not so. Not only there is no significant correlation at 




























































































but even in the South the picture is the same. The left gains 
more seats in this area, but not because here the number of 
candidates is greater than elsewhere.
In sum, contrary to what has been suggested in the aftermath of 
the elections, the number of candidates per district is not an 
explanatory factor. However in order to explain the final 
outcome the relevant variable is the voters' response, that is 
the number of votes actually collected by the numerous minor 
candidates. It is the capacity of these candidates to get more 
or less significant electoral support that might have determine 
the outcome of the competition among the major candidates. This 
is what we define as fragmentation on the 'demand side'.
The fragmentation on the demand-side: concentration/dispersion 
of the vote
When the dimension of candidate fragmentation is combined with 
that of the vote dispersion among candidates, the conclusion is 
that it is necessary to distinguish between the 'fragmentation 
which counts' and that which is irrelevant. The former counts 
exactly because it subtracts votes to the competition among the 
major candidates. The latter does not count because it does not 
produce this effect. The issue is how to study the 
"fragmentation which counts". In this essay , we will start 
from the notion of the dispersed vote , defined as the 
difference between the total of the valid votes and the vote 




























































































dispersed vote is the complement of the vote concentration 
index of the first two candidates: the greater the vote 
concentration, the lower the dispersed vote. The underlying 
assumption in this case is that the real electoral competition 
is the one between the two major candidates and that all or 
quasi all the dispersed vote in a plurality system is 
potentially available for the first two candidates once the 
system gets consolidated and the voters learn the new rules of 
the game. The other candidates may be a disturbing factor, 
but they are not really competitive.
The notion of dispersed vote however does not make any 
distinction among minor candidates. Such a distinction can be 
useful in the Italian case given the high level of 
fragmentation on the supply side. For this reason, next to the 
dispersed vote we will pay attention to two different types of 
votes to minor candidates: the residual vote and the peripheral 
vote. Both are sub-sets of the dispersed vote. The residual 
vote is the difference between the total valid votes and the 
sum of the votes gained by the first four candidates. Why four 
? In most districts next to the candidates of the three 
national cartels (PL or PBG, Patto and Progressisti) we find 
a fourth candidate with such a political profile that he/she 
cannot be regarded as a minor candidate (for instance, the 
MS I-AN candidate in the North or the candidate of the Lista 
Pannella) .The peripheral vote is the vote given to local 




























































































More precisely, we have operationally defined such a type of 
vote as the vote given to candidates that : 1) in each 
district have got less than 4 % of the vote, and 2) did 
not belong to national lists, and were not connected to 
lists which obtained more than 4% of the votes in the same 
district. It is important to emphasise that, in order not to 
inflate the peripheral vote, these conditions are cumulative.
(Table 11 about here)
In Table 11 we have reported the mean levels of the dispersed, 
residual and peripheral vote by branch and by area. The 
dispersed vote shows the following features: 1) it is high, 
pointing to the generally low vote concentration on the first 
two candidates; 2) it is systematically higher for the Senate 
than for the Chamber (10 or more % points); and 3) it is 
roughly the same in all the areas. In the Senate , the 
candidates beyond the first two collected more than a third of 
the vote. However, it is clear that the vote concentration on 
the first two candidates can indicate the local strength of a 
single party/cartel and therefore being a misleading indicator 
of the competitiveness of the first two candidates. This is one 
of the reasons to resort to other indicators that capture 
better the idea of the ' shrinking of the electorate ’ 





























































































The residual vote which orients itself towards the candidates 
beyond the first four is such an indicator. Compared with the 
dispersed vote , the difference between Chamber and Senate is 
even bigger. For the Chamber, the vote is almost entirely 
concentrated on the first four candidates whereas in the Senate 
14 % of the electorate has given its vote to candidates placed 
after the first four. Even in the case of the residual vote 
territorial differences are not particularly striking .
With the third indicator - the peripheral vote - we intend to 
measure what proportion of the vote directs itself to local 
candidates, non partisan candidates, and "self-made 
candidates". The figures of the peripheral vote do not modify 
the general picture so far discussed, but for an important 
element: in the Southern senatorial districts the peripheral 
vote coincides almost entirely with the residual vote. 
Notwithstanding that in this area the number of minor 
candidates is lower than in the North, they collect by far a 
greater share of the votes. We have shown before that the 
most competitive arena is precisely the Senate in the South and 
it is therefore plausible that one of the causes of this 
greater competitiveness be the significant presence of this 
type of vote 3 .
To explore further this hypothesis we have run several tests 
to determine the relationship between the level of the 
dispersed, residual and peripheral vote and the cartel of the 




























































































result has emerged from this analysis. The level of the 
dispersed or residual vote is not associated with, and 
therefore it does not influence, the victory of the 
Progressisti or of the candidates of the Poli 10 . The presence 
of a strong residual vote lowers the winning threshold , but it 
does not help explain the victories of the left versus the 
right 11. The picture is different in the case of the 
dispersed vote. The relationship between competitiveness 
(intended as closeness of the race) and the dispersed vote in 
the Senate (but not in the Chamber) is in this case confirmed. 
The districts showing the highest percentage of dispersed vote 
are those where the competition between the first two 
candidates is greater (see Table 12)
(Table 12 about here)
We can draw the conclusion at this point that the dispersed 
vote is certainly an important element for the explanation of 
the final outcome of these elections, particularly in the 
South. In this area, the absence of a dominant political force 
after the demise of the DC and the regionalist nature of the 
electoral system for the Senate have left room for a plethora 
of minor local candidates which have been able to capture a 
considerable amount of the floating vote. This has lowered 
significantly the winning threshold in the single member 
districts and it has increased electoral competitiveness. The 
consequence has been a more balanced electoral outcome 




























































































cartel which has obtained 45.7% of the single-member seats and 
the right-wing coalition which has received 51.4%.
At this point in the development of our argument we need to 
prove that the dispersed vote is predominantly moderate. If 
so, we could draw the conclusion that this type of vote might 
in the future alter the electoral balance in this area in 
favour of the right. Indeed, given the fact that the high 
level of the dispersed vote has lowered the winning threshold, 
and this in turn has favoured the Progressisti, we conclude 
that any future reduction of such type of vote will benefit the 
right and will put an end to the 'anomaly' of a competitive 
South. Let us take a closer look at the elements that support 
the hypothesis on the moderate nature of the dispersed vote in 
the South. One is the comparison between the mean % vote of the 
winning candidates of the PBG in the Chamber (44.4 %) and in 
the Senate (36.2 %) in the South. It is plausible to affirm 
that the winning threshold in the Senate is so much lower 
because here the dispersed vote amounts to 12.66 % of the
total vote, whereas in the Chamber is only 1.10 %. For the 
Progressisti the picture is entirely different. In the Chamber 
they win with a mean vote of 37.8 % and they get 33.9 % of the 
seats, whereas in the Senate they win with a mean vote of 35.1 
% and they get 45.7 % of the seats. It follows that the 
lowering of the winning threshold benefit them considerably. 
The possible explanation is that the Progressisti have a core 
support of about 35 % of the votes versus more than 40 % for 




























































































as we know, is significant only in the Senate) allows them to 
be (more) competitive with the moderate candidates. Even in 
the North the winning threshold is lower in the Senate compared 
to the Chamber. However, in this case the Progressisti are 
unable to benefit from it because the gap between their core 
support and that of the PL is too high for the dispersed vote 
(which is also here consistent) to make any difference 12 .
Another way to control the hypothesis of the moderate nature 
of the dispersed vote is to check whether there is any 
correlation between such a vote and the votes given to the 
candidates of the PBG. If there were a significant correlation 
we should be able to find that the PBG candidates have received 
fewer votes where the level of the dispersed vote is higher. 
Figure 2 shows that an inverse correlation between these two 
variables exists. Its value is -.378 which corresponds to an 
explained variance of about 14 %. This figure is the more
significant if we compare it with the value of .0122 of the 
correlation between the % vote of the Progressisti candidates 
and the level of the dispersed vote. These two variables are 
independent from each other.
(Figure 2 about here)
The basic patterns of competition and their variants
One of the main features of these elections is the absence of a 




























































































in all or almost all districts throughout the country we find 
the same parties or the same cartels structuring voters' 
choices. In our case this has not happened since in many 
districts we find, alongside the candidates of the national 
coalitions, also local candidates who have collected, as we saw 
previously, a substantial amount of votes. Moreover, and more 
importantly, the national cartels were not the same throughout 
the country since their make-up was different in different 
areas. This is true particularly of the right. As a result, the 
high number of candidates per district on the one hand and the 
territorial differentiation of the electoral coalitions on the 
other have produced a mosaic of patterns of competition making 
these elections an interesting case of 'competition of 
variable geography' (Di Virgilio 1995). Out of this mosaic, we 
have identified three basic patterns and three variants by 
taking into consideration the four candidates who have shown 
to be competitive in each district (Table 13) 13 .
(Table 13 about here)
We define the first of these patterns as the 'Centre-North 
pattern' . Its main feature is the systematic division of the 
right. MS I-AN has its own candidates in almost all of the 
districts in the North and in the Centre. Yet, in spite of this 
competition from the right, Forza Italia and the Lega Nord 
have succeeded in getting the overwhelming majority of the 
seats in this area. Actually, this division may have helped the 




























































































result in the Senate is somewhat different; the PL wins fewer 
seats, but this is more the consequence of the greater 
competitiveness of the left in this arena rather than the 
effect of the split of the right. The conclusion is that in the 
North the division of the right has caused no major damage to 
it. It actually might have been a clever tactical move.
The same pattern characterised the electoral competition in 
the Centre. Here the outcome, as we know, is radically 
different. The left wins almost all of the seats leaving the PL 
just with three seats in the Chamber (in the Emilia region) 
and one in the Senate in the same constituency. Here the 
division of the right affects considerably the outcome. It is 
highly unlikely that the Progressisti would have been able to 
do so well in Toscana and particularly in the Marche if the 
right had been united. To support this hypothesis, we refer to 
the low winning threshold in many districts and to the small 
margins of victory between the winning candidate of the 
Progressisti and the runner up of the PL. The Centre-North 
pattern has a variant (with few cases, however) based on the 
presence of 'other' candidates. These candidates appear in our 
data because they have squeezed out the MSI-AN candidate from 
the first four positions in 10 districts in the Chamber and 15 
in the Senate. Even so however the outcome does not change.
The structure of competition in the South is much more varied. 
The basic patterns are two since , unlike in the North and in 




























































































(patterns 3 and 6). Moreover, there is the Lista Pannella that 
has an impact on the district races, sharing this role with 
the 'other' candidates (patterns 4 and 5). In the South , the 
division of the right does not pay (pattern 6). Out of the 41 
cases belonging to this pattern in the Chamber, the 
Progressisti win 31 (75.6%). In the Senate they actually win 
all of them, but the cases are few because in this arena the 
right was not divided. When the right is united, the victory 
margins shrink, but the left remains competitive. The Lista 
Pannella is a surprise. Its (relative) success makes a 
significant difference. In fact, the PBG does better when the 
LP candidate is able to be among the first four (pattern 4): 
in the Chamber out of 26 seats it gets 21, and in the Senate it 
picks up 21 out of 29. The outcome of left-right competition is 
completely different (in the sense of being more balanced) 
when the place of the LP candidate is taken by one of the 
'others' (pattern 3). The inference is that the LP subtracts 
votes to the left, whereas the independent candidates (the 
'others') do the same thing with the right. This is consistent 
with the evidence provided on the influence of the dispersed 
vote, but the point needs to be tested further.
The last pattern (5) is based on three-way races. The fourth 
candidate is missing because it does not meet our criteria of 
relevance. This pattern represents a puzzle, partly because of 
the limited number of available cases in the Senate. In the 
Chamber (60 cases) the absence of the fourth candidate 




























































































victories is quite similar to that of pattern 3 where the 
fourth candidate is one of the 'others'. Still, with this 
pattern the left does better than in the 'Pannella variant'. In 
the Senate the picture is the opposite: the left wins 8 out of 
the 12 seats, but the number of cases is too small to support 
any meaningful conclusion.
In short, the analysis based on the patterns of competition 
helps us define new points and refine previous observations:
1. the left is more competitive in the Senate;
2. the divided right (pattern 6) loses in the Chamber a 
significant number of seats ;
3. the relative success of the Lista Pannella ( whose 
candidates are among the first four in 35 seats in the Chamber 
and 30 in the Senate) is associated with a poor performance of 
the left ;
4. the presence of independent candidates (the 'others') 
(pattern 3) turns out to benefit the left much more in the 
Senate than in the Chamber.
Candidates versus their Electoral Cartels
As we pointed out, a most important feature of these elections 
was the fact that the main competing actors were not parties, 
but party coalitions or cartels. These cartels have been formed 
on the basis of agreements on the allotment of plurality seats 
among their members. Such agreements called for the 




























































































candidate nominated by one of the cartel's components, but 
representing the cartel as a whole. Our purpose in this section 
is to study the electoral performance of these cartels, that is 
how voters have responded to the choice of candidates made by 
them. To this end, we will try to measure the extent to 
which the candidates of each coalition have been able 1) to 
retain all the votes in their target area and eventually 2) to 
reach out of their area and seize other votes. We will refer 
to these two 'qualities' of candidates as their capacity of 
internal mobilisation and their capacity of external 
attraction
To study this dimension of candidate performance we can use 
the data supplied by the second ballot for the Chamber, the 
list vote. Thanks to this vote, we can compare the votes 
received by the plurality candidates of each cartel with the 
total amount of the list votes collected by the parties 
belonging to the same cartel. For example, we take the 
candidates of Rifondazione Comunista (RC) who have run in the 
single-member districts of the Chamber as representatives of 
the Progressisti and we compute the mean vote they have 
received; at the same time we compute the mean vote received in 
the same districts by all the Progressisti lists connected to 
the RC candidates. Finally, we compare the two set of data. The 
list vote is important because it can be considered a good 
indicator of the quality (that is, the safety) of the district. 




























































































get in a given district a high percentage of votes is plausible 
to infer that the district is a good district for the left 
candidates, i.e. a safe district. Behind this conclusion there 
is however an important assumption: that the list vote be a 
sincere vote, a vote that reflects the 'true' preferences of 
the voters. We think this assumption, in the context of these 
elections, holds well. Unlike the expression of a majority 
vote, the list vote allows the voter to express his/her 
partisan identity without having to resort to sophisticated 
strategic calculations (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte, 1995) 14 . 
On the contrary, it is less plausible that voters, who reject a 
disliked plurality candidate, decide not to vote for their 
most preferred party for the only reason that it is connected 
to a candidate they don't appreciate.
By comparing candidate and list votes for each cartel, three 
possible results may occur: 1) the candidate vote is greater 
than that for the supporting lists; 2) no difference between 
the two values; 3) the list vote is greater than the candidate 
vote. These results identify different types of candidates 
15 . The first case defines the 'excellent candidate', the one 
who is capable of reaching out and attracting new votes in 
addition to mobilising fully his/her target electorate. This 
means that there are voters who voted for him/her, though they 
didn't vote in the proportional arena for any of the lists of 
the cartel he/she belongs to. Therefore this difference can be 
attributed to a personal vote, a vote given to the candidate 




























































































party or cartel affiliation. The second case identifies the 
' good candidate' , the one who is able to mobilise all of 
his/her target vote. He/she picks up all of the votes within 
the cartel, but none outside of it. The cartel works well. It 
can win or lose, but in any case the candidate chosen to 
represent it does not help or hinder. The third case in our 
list, and the last we deal with here, is that of the 'weak 
candidate' . He/she not only does not reach out and seizes votes 
outside his/her target cartel electorate, but, what is worse, 
he/she is unable to retain all of the votes within it. The 
cartel does not perform well in this case. It loses pieces of 
its potential electorate. The candidate is not appreciated at 
all ; he/she is actually rejected by some of the voters who 
identify themselves with the parties affiliated to his/her 
cartel.
This latter case, which obviously hinders the cartel making it 
less competitive, may depend from the existence of two modes 
of electoral behaviour : the strategic vote or the 
ideological vote. Strategic voting takes place when voters 
prefer not to vote for their most preferred candidate in their 
district because they perceive him/her as a losing candidate. 
They don't want 'to waste' their ballot and choose to vote for 
a candidate with greater chance of success. Ideological voting 
takes place when voters refuse to vote for the candidate who 
represents their most preferred cartel in their district. 
Whatever the reason behind their distaste for the candidate, 




























































































another cartel. They 'exit' the cartel. However, we assume 
that both strategic voters and ideological voters cast their 
list vote in favour of the party they prefer the most within 
the cartel. They defect in one arena, but remain loyal in the 
other. If so, the difference between these two types of votes 
is an indicator of the low level of electoral cohesion of the 
cartel and of the lack of loyalty of its voters. The voters, by 
accepting or rejecting the cartel candidates, act as the 
ultimate and exclusive judges of their quality. Rejecting the 
cartel candidates amounts to outright defection. A high rate of 
defection indicates a low capacity of internal mobilisation and 
consequently a weak coalitional discipline of the voters. It 
follows that a cartel with a low level of internal discipline 
is less competitive than others.
(Table 14 about here)
Let 's look now at the data in Table 14. These data allow us to 
check the hypotheses we formulated on the electoral cohesion 
of the cartels. We will start from the Progressisti. The first 
observation has to do with the allotment of the seats to the 
various components of the coalition. Rete and Indipendenti di 
Sinistra are the groups most disfavoured. Their candidates, in 
fact, have had to compete in difficult districts, where the 
mean vote for the left was low “ . This fact explains both the 
low rate of success of these candidates (see the last column of 




























































































vote and the cartel's mean vote. In these cases, the evidence 
supports the hypothesis that the problem lies with the 
districts, not with the candidates. Actually, the candidates 
of the Rete and of the Indipendenti have done relatively well 
in these difficult districts. In fact, they get there almost as 
many votes as the number of proportional votes received by all 
the lists belonging to the Progressisti cartel. In other words, 
these candidates have done better than their more fortunate 
colleagues, like those of the PDS and RC, who have received on 
average less than the list votes of the Progressisti , though 
they were running in good districts (compare the list vote for 
the Progressisti cartel with the votes to the PDS and RC 
candidates).
This is the most important observation we can draw from the 
table: the candidates of the leftist cartel perform 
systematically worse than the lists of the Progressisti 
(leaving aside the two candidates of Rinascita Socialista and 
those of the Rete). In some of the cases, the difference 
between the two set of values is minimal (Verdi and 
Indipendenti), but in other cases is significant. The RC 
candidates lose on average 2.8% of the votes compared to the 
cartel lists. What is really impressive is not so much the 
individual comparisons, but the overall result, its systematic 
feature. The candidates of the left show a weak capacity of 
internal mobilisation. When they perform well ( in very few 
cases), they are at best able to retain all or almost all their 




























































































of external attraction whatsoever. One possible explanation is 
that the 'summability' of the leftist electorates is lower than 
the 'coalitional capability' of the elites. After all, the 
leftist elites have been able to find an agreement on the 
parcelling out of the districts among the different components 
of the Progressisti cartel in spite of their high number (8). 
However, when the product of this agreement has been offered to 
the voters, some of them have rejected it. This behaviour 
depends on several factors. We have synthesised them partially 
through the concepts of ideological vote and strategic vote, 
though we are unable at this stage to measure their specific 
impact.
Strategic voting is a form of rational or useful voting. It 
not only requires a precise knowledge of how electoral rules 
actually work, but also substantial analytical skills. Voters 
must be able to calculate correctly the possible effects of 
their vote. Probably, the strategic vote has had a limited 
impact on the Progressisti candidates. Ideological voting is 
radically different. It is a more 'emotional' form of 
behaviour. This does not mean necessarily that the ideological 
vote never has a rational component. Quite the opposite. Those 
voters who decide not to cast their ballot for a candidate 
proposed by the cartel where they find their most preferred 
party, do so for a reason. And the reason lies in the 
ideological distance that separates their position in the 
political space from that of the proposed candidate in their 




























































































abstain whatever the consequences for the cartel. This is more 
straightforward and therefore more instinctive vote. For these 
reasons, we tend to believe that the 'malaise' of the Italian 
left has to be found here, in its weak ideological cohesion at 
the mass level.
On this point, the findings pertaining to Rifondazione 
Comunista - the party located at the extreme left - are very 
telling. Its candidates are those who perform the worst, though 
they win. Actually, their rate of success is the highest of all 
the leftist groups : 46.6 % of its candidates get elected. This 
rate is even higher than that of the PDS. Yet, RC wins because 
its candidates are placed in safe districts, not because its 
candidates are able to attract votes. Quite to the contrary, 
they lose on average 2,8 % of the combined left vote. Our 
hypothesis is that this high rate of defection is due to 
ideological voters, voters of the moderate left who, being 
offered a RC candidate in their district, simply refuse to vote 
for him/her. The same hypothesis we can apply to the case of 
Alleanza Democratica (AD) candidates, who are also unable to 
mobilise all of the left electorate. In this case, too, it is 
likely that voters of the extreme left who consider the AD 
candidate too far ideologically choose not to vote for 
him/her.
The ideological distance at the mass level (not at the elites 




























































































outcome of these elections from the point of view of the left 
and its future prospects. The 'summability' of its different 
electoral segments is a necessary condition for the left if it 
wants to win in the future. The replacement of PR with a 
predominantly majoritarian system has made this problem even 
more critical. Previously, in the age of proportional 
representation, the summing up of the leftist votes could 
remain a responsibility of the elites, without being subject to 
immediate and uncertain electoral tests. In the plurality age, 
the electoral test is everything. he sum is done in the 
electoral arena, not in Parliament or in party headquarters. Of 
course, in light of the results of these elections, it is 
quite clear that it is not enough for the Italian left to sum 
up its votes to be able to win. But the data suggest strongly 
that in order to become more competitive it must before 
anything else reduce its internal ideological distance.
The performance of the right is quite different. Whereas the 
Progressisti were not able to mobilise completely the leftist 
vote, let alone attract others, we can see that both the PL and 
PBG candidates (with the only marginal exception of the UC 
within the PBG, but it is only one case) perform better than 
their respective lists. The record of the candidates of FI 
within the PL (+ 3.7%) and that of the LN candidates (+ 3.4 
%) is significant. But even more significant is the 
performance of the MSI-AN candidates within the PBG: not only 




























































































outperform the FI candidates who get instead only 0.3 % more 
than the list votes. The finding about MSI-AN deserves to be 
emphasised because it is a relevant indicator of the
interchangeability of moderate candidates in the South. We 
could have expected that the MSI-AN candidates, whose party is 
located at the extreme right of the political spectrum, would 
show a capacity of internal mobilisation inferior to that of 
the FI candidates. This is not the case. Their capacity is 
actually greater than that of the FI candidates and even
greater than that of the CCD. In addition, the mean vote of 
these candidates (37.8%) is higher on the whole than that of 
the PBG candidates (37.2 %) and their rate of success (77.5 %) 
is greater than that of the FI candidates (57.1 %) and greater 
than those of the CCD (61.9 %). This finding might be
influenced by the quality of the districts where the MSI-AN 
candidates were present, but this explanation does not really 
hold up. In fact, the evidence on the list vote shows that the 
PBG was weaker precisely in those districts where AN candidates 
where running rather than where we find FI or CCD candidates.
In conclusion, the data on the PBG show the MSI-AN as the 
most effective force of the cartel. In part, this may be the 
effect of the greater social embeddedness of the MSI-AN 
compared to FI and/or of the greater visibility of its
candidates. This qualification however does not weaken the 
surprising fact represented by the absence of any residual 




























































































right. The nomination of more extremist candidates, instead of 
hindering the cartel, seems on the contrary to help it. Unlike 
those of the left, the votes of the right are ' additionable'. 
This makes the PBG candidates not only interchangeable, but in 
some cases even more appealing than those of other parties 
outside the cartel. The ideological vote is not a problem for 
the right. The problem of the right, if any, is the dispersed 
vote in the South. More generally, we can conclude that the 
capacity of mobilisation of all the candidates of the Poli may 
hint at the presence of strategic voting in their favour. Such 
a phenomenon could be the result of the perception by centrist 
voters (for example, Patto per 1'Italia sympathisers) that the 
Poli candidates were the only credible competitors against the 
Progressisti .
Conclusions
In this essay we have interpreted the outcome of the March 1994 
elections looking at the patterns of competition that have 
characterised the plurality component of the new electoral 
system. The first point we have analysed is the electoral 
origin of the divided parliament. The first and more direct 
cause of the divided parliament is to be found in the 
apparently marginal but actually crucial differences in the 
electoral law for the two branches. The total scorporo of the 
Senate has hammered the winning side (the Poli) much more than 
the partial scorporo of the lower Chamber. However, the 




























































































from the compensating effect of the proportional component. 
Having discarded the hypothesis of the different orientation of 
the youth vote, we have pointed out to 1) the higher proportion 
of votes collected by the Left alliance in the Senate as 
compared to the Chamber; 2) the higher fragmentation of the 
vote in the senatorial contests; 3) the damages produced to the 
right by the peripheral and localistic candidates vote. These 
factors have lowered substantially the winning threshold in 
several areas of the country and particularly in the South, 
allowing the left cartel to compete more successfully.
The second major aspect highlighted concerns the territorial 
differences in the distribution of votes. The plurality 
elections have clearly shown that both for the Chamber and the 
Senate the country is divided into three areas, two of which 
have been totally non-competitive (the North hegemonised by the 
right and the Centre hegemonised by the Left) and one (the 
South) characterised by competitive pattern and a balanced 
outcome.
The third major point concerns the electoral cohesion of the 
cartels. The possibility to compare in the Chamber results the 
lists votes with the plurality votes to the candidates offers 
the opportunity to evaluate the compatibility of the different 
party electorates. It was shown that while the right wing 
cartel manages to mobilise its entire proportional constituency 
in favour of its candidates, the left is unable to do so. We 




























































































in the left of an 'ideological vote' (and to a less extent also 
of a 'strategic vote'), which find difficult to accept 
candidates of allied parties who are not its own. Ideology 
fosters partisanship and belongings, but hinders vote 
transferability, which, in the context of plurality formula 
with multi-party electoral cartels is a crucial key to victory.
Beyond the electoral defection attributable to ideological and 
strategic factors, it is unquestionable that in the plurality 
contest the left is not competitive because it has too few 
votes. The most astonishing result of these elections is the 
percentage of votes the lists and the candidates of the left 
(the entire leftl) have gained in the North: respectively 25% 
and 25.7% (Chamber). But even in the South, where the 
performance was better, the left can count on slightly more 
than 30% of the votes. With these percentages it is very hard 
to be competitive in plurality races. In addition to this, 
without electoral cohesion not even a left electoral base close 
to 40 % of the votes can ensure success. This is why the 
question of the additionability of the leftist votes is just as 
important as that of finding new voters. In these specific 
elections the left has avoided a débàcle thanks to the fore 
mentioned special conditions. But these are aleatory factors. 
As actors learn better how the new electoral system works, it 




























































































For sure the Italian electoral market is today by far more 
'open' than it was previously the case (Diamanti and 
Mannheimer,1994; Sani, 1992). This higher volatility of the 
vote combined with the amplifying effects of the plurality 
formula leave open the door to results even radically different 
from those of the March elections. This, however, will not 
occur unless the left cartel will manage to become more 
competitive in the sense specified in this paper. And without a 
competitive left, that is a left with a credible chance of 
victory, the Italian party system is bounded to remain, as it 
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Table 1: Number of single member districts and of Pr seats for each constituency ( Chamber and Senate)
Chamber Senate
constituencies Total Seats Single- Pr constituencies Total Seats Single- Pr
member seats member seats
seats seats
Valle d'Aosta 1 1 0 Valle d'Aosta 1 1 0
Piemonte 1 25 19 6 Piemonte 23 17 6
Piemonte 2 23 17 6
Lombardia 1 41 31 10 Lombardia 47 35 12
Lombardia 2 42 32 10
Lombardia 3 15 11 4
Trentino A.A. 10 8 2 Trentino A.A. 7 6 1
Veneto 1 29 22 7 Veneto 23 17 6
Veneto 2 20 15 5
Friuli V G. 13 10 3 Friuli V G 7 5 2
Liguria 19 14 5 Liguria 9 6 3
Emilia Rom. 43 32 11 Emilia Rom. 21 15 6
Toscana 39 29 10 Toscana 19 14 5
Umbria 9 7 2 Umbria 7 5 2
Marche 16 12 4 Marche 8 6 2
Lazio 1 42 32 10 Lazio 28 21 7
Lazio 2 15 11 4
Abruzzo 14 11 3 Abruzzo 7 5 2
Molise 4 3 1 Molise 2 2 0
Campania 1 33 25 8 Campania 30 22 8
Campania 2 29 22 7
Puglia 45 34 11 Puglia 22 16 6
Basilicata 7 5 2 Basilicata 7 5 2
Calabria 23 17 6 Calabria 11 8 3
Sicilia 1 27 20 7 Sicilia 27 20 7
Sicilia 2 28 21 7
Sardegna 18 14 4 Sardegna 9 6 3




























































































Table 2: From the old to the new political parties 
parties (in the 1980’s) parties (in the 1990's)
raditional partes:
- Partito Popolare Italiano (January 1994)
- Rete-Movimento democratico (Orlando) (1991)
- Popolari per la riforma (Segni) (October 1992) - Patto Segni (November 1993)
}C - Cristiano Sociali (Gorrieri, Camiti) (1993)
- Centro cristiano democratico (Mastella, D'Onofrio, Casini)
- Alleanza Nazionale (Fiori, Selva) (January 1994)
- PDS (January 1991)
’ CI - RC (February 1991 )
- Rete-Movimento Democratico (Novelli) (1991 )
’ SI - PS (Del Turco) (January 1994)
- Rinascita Socialista (Mattina, Benvenuto) (June 1993)
- Alleanza Democratica (Ruffolo, Benvenuto)
- Patto Segni (Amato) (June 1993)
- Federazione Liberal Socialista - Unione dei democratici e dei socialisti
(Boniver, Intini, Piro) (Automn 1993)
flSI-Destra Nazionale - MSI-Alleanza Nazionale (January 1994)
’ RI - PRI (La Malfa)
- Alleanza Democratica (Bogi, Visentini)
’LI - PLI - Federazione del liberali (Zanone, Patuelli)





- Unione dei democratici e dei socialisti (Ferri)
- Alleanza democratica
- Lista Pannella (1992) - Riformatori (1994)
iga veneta (1983) 
ega Lombarda (1987)
Lega Nord (1991)
ferdi sole che ride (1985) 
ferdi Arcobaleno (1987)
Verdi (December 1990)
Forza Italia (February 1994)
ìource A. Di Virgilio, Dai partiti ai poli: la politica delle alleanze, in S. Badolini and R. D'Alimonte (ed ), Maggoritario ma non 
































































































- Rete - Movimento democratico







- Partito popolare italiano
Patto per l'Italia Popolari per la riforma





- Unione di Centro
- Centro cristiano-democratico
Polo delle libertà - Polo liberal- democratico
- Lega Nord
- (Riformatori]
Polo del buon governo
- Forza Italia
- Unione di Centro
- Centro cristiano-democratico
- Polo liberal- democratico
- Msi-Alleanza nazionale
- [Unione dei democratici e dei socialisti]
Source: A. Di Virgilio, Dai partiti ai poli: la politica delle alleanze, in S. Bartolini and R. D'Alimonte (ed.), Maggioritario ma non troppo. 
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Fig. 1: Mean % of Votes of the Winner by 
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Fig. 2: Percantage of Votes to the PBG Candidates and 
level of the peripheral vote (Senate)
6 7






























































































Table 13: Plurality winners by main cartel and by the pattern of competition in the district
Chamber Winners _____________  Senate Winners
Nr. base pattern: 
competing 
candidates
variants left (1) right (2) total (3) left (1) right (2) total (3)
Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. %
N o r t h e r  a n d  C e n t r a l  I t a ly  P a t t e r n
FI/LN +
1 AN + Patto + 
Prog.






1 10,0 9 90,0 10 100,0 0 0,0 15 100,0 15 100,0
S o u t h e r n  U n it e d  R ig h t  P a t te r n
FI/AN + 
3 Patto + 
Prog. + 
Others










21 35,0 39 65,0 60 100,0 8 66,7 2 16,7 12 83,4
S o u t h e r n  D iv id e d  R ig h t  P a t te r n
FI + AN +
6 Patto + 31 75,6 8 19,5 41 95,1 5 100,0 0 0,0 5 100,0
Prog.
(1) Left = Progressisti
(2) Right = Polo della Libertà, Polo del Buon Governo and their variants
(3) When thè total % does not add to 100 it mean that at least a seat has been won by other candidates than those of thè 
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Table A: General results of the Chamber of Deputies by electoral cartels and parties: 
votes, sngle-member, proportional and total seats
electoral cartels list votes proportional single-member total
and parties seats seats seats
Nr. % Nr. % ‘ Nr. % Nr. %
PDS 7.855.610 20,4 37 23,9 72 15,2 109 17,3
RC 2.334.029 6.0 12 7,7 27 5,7 39 6,2
Verdi 1.042.496 2,7 0 0.0 11 2,3 11 1.7
PSI 841.739 2,2 0 0.0 14 2,9 14 2,2
Rete 718.403 1.9 0 0.0 6 1.3 6 1,0
AD 452.396 1.2 0 0,0 18 3,8 18 2,9
CS 5 1.1 5 0.8
RS 1 0,2 1 0,2
Ind. Sin. 10 2,1 10 1.6
Tot Progressisti 13.244.673 34,3 49 31,6 164 34,5 213 33,8
PPI 4.268.940 11.1 29 18,7 4 0.8 33 5,2
Patto Segni 1.795.270 4.7 13 8,4 0 0,0 13 2,1
Tot. Patto per l'Italia 6.064.210 15,7 42 27,1 4 0,8 46 7,3
Forza Italia 8.119.287 21,0
Forza Italia 25 16.1 74 15,6 99 15,7
CCD (1) 7 4.5 22 4.6 29 4.6
UDC 4 0,8 4 0.6
PLD 2 0,4 2 0,3
Riformatori 6 1,3 6 1,0
AN 5.202.698 13,5 22 14.2 87 18,3 109 17.3
Lega Nord 3.237.026 8,4 10 6,5 107 22,5 117 18,6
LP 1.355.739 3.5 0 0.0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Tot Polì 17.914.750 46,4 64 41,3 302 (2) 63,6 366 58,1
SVP 231.826 0.6 0 0.0 3 0.6 3 0,5
Lista Valle d'Aosta 1 0,2 1 0,2
Lega d'Azione 59.853 0.2 0 0,0 1 0.2 1 0.2
Meridionale
Socialdemocrazia 179.367 0.5 0 0,0 0 0.0 0 0,0
Lega Alpina Lumbarda 135.954 0,4 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Verdi-Verdi 32.815 0.1 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Altre Leghe 134.471 0.3 0 0.0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Liste autonomiste 33.425 0.1 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0.0
Other Lists 565.779 1.5 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Tot Others 1.373.490 3,6 0 0,0 5 1,1 5 0,8
Total 38.594.477 100.0 155 100,0 475 100,0 630 100,0
(1) The votes for the CCD, presenting Itself with its own list only in the Molise, have been included in the 'Other Lists'; 
the 7 proportional seats gained are therefore been attributed to CCD candidates present in the Forza Italia lists.
(2) These seats have been won as follows: 164 by the PL (of which: Lega Nord 107, Forza Italia 38, CCD 8, Riformatori 6, U 
PLD 2); 129 by the PBG (of which: AN 79, Forza Italia 36, CCD 13, UDC 1); 1 by Forza Italia-CCD (Mastella) and 8 by AN a'lor
Source: our own elaboration of the data of the Ministero defl'lnterno and of the organisational headquarters of the
parties (for what concerns party affiliation of the elected). Party affiliations are considered at the moment of the election; change



























































































able B: General results of the Senate by electoral cartels and parties 7 1
lectoral cartels votes proportional single-member total
nd parties seats seats seats
Nr. % Nr. % Nr. % Nr. %
•DS 14 16,9 46 19,8 60 19,0
SC 4 4,8 14 6,0 18 5,7
ferdi 0 0,0 7 3,0 7 2,2
'SI 1 1,2 11 4,7 12 3,8
!ete 4 4,8 2 0,9 6 1,9
.D 3 3,6 7 3,0 10 3,2
;s 0 0,0 4 1,7 4 1,3
SS 0 0,0 1 0,4 1 0,3
id. Sin. 0 0,0 4 1,7 4 1,3
of. Progressisti 10.883.507 32,9 26 31,3 96 41,4 122 38,7
•PI 27 32,5 3 1,3 30 9,5
'atto Segni 1 1,2 0 0,0 1 0,3
o t  Patto per l'Italia 5.518.615 16,7 28 33,7 3 1,3 31 9,8
'olo delle Libertà 6 .570.544 19,9
'olo del Buon Governo 4 .544.671 13.7
orza Italia 150.326 ( 1) 0,5 7 8,4 25 10,8 32 10,2
;c d 2 2.4 10 4,3 12 3,8
IDC 0 0,0 3 1,3 3 1.0
Siformatori 0 0,0 1 (2) 0,4 1 0,3
tN 2.079 593 (3) 6,3 13 15,7 34 14,7 47 14,9
ega Nord 5 6.0 55 23,7 60 19,0
’annella-Riformatori 767.400 2,3 1 1,2 0 0,0 1 0,3
ot. Poli 14.112.534 42,7 28 (4) 33,7 128 (5) 55,1 156 49,5
ega Alpina Lumbarda 246.476 0,7 1 1,2 0 0,0 1 0,3
;v p 217.250 0,7 0 0,0 3 1,3 3 1,0
ista Magris 61.398 0,2 0 0,0 1 0,4 1 0,3
ista Valle d'Aosta 27.493 0,1 0 0,0 1 0,4 1 0,3
’art. Pensionati 250.543 0,8 0 0.0 0 0,0 0 0,0
•S d'Az. 88.351 0,3 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
'erdi-Verdi 68.068 0,2 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
locialdemocrazia 66.467 0,2 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
iltre Leghe 341.220 1,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
iste autonomiste 175.684 0,5 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
)ther Lists 1.020.796 3,1 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
o t  A ltri 2.563.746 7,8 1 1,2 5 2,2 6 1,9
otal 33.078.402 100,0 83 100,0 232 100,0 315 100,0
1 ) The votes obtained in the region Abruzzo by the alliance Forza Italia-CCD, whose candidates competed against those 
f Alleanza Nazionale
2) Mr. Stanzani, candidate for the Polo della Libertà in Veneto
3) These are the votes obtained by AN with candidates outside the Polo del Buon Governo Cartel (in the regions of Piemonte, 
ombardia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Toscana, Marche, Umbria e Abruzzo)
4) These seats have been won as follows: 8 by the Polo delle Libertà (of which: Lega Nord 5 and Forza Italia 3), 10 by the Polo del 
luon Governo (of which: AN 5, Forza Italia 3, CCD 2), 8 by AN alone, 1 by Forza Italia-CCD and 1 by the Lista Pannella-Riformatori 
Scoppelliti)
5) Among which 74 won by the Polo della Libertà and 54 by the Polo del Buon Governo
Source our own elaboration of the data of the Ministero dell'Interno and of the organisational headquarters of the
larties (for what concerns party affiliation of the elected). Party affiliations are considered at the moment of the election; changes
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'  We would like to thank Alessandro Chiaramonte, Aldo Di Virgilio and Massimiliano Miglio for their 
co-operation in several phases of this research.
1 Note that this party has changed again its name in January 1995. The old MSI label has been 
dropped and the party now calls itself Alleanza Nazionale
2 Running several simulation Chiaramonte has demonstrated that the scorporo produced this result. 
Without scorporo, or with a partial scorporo like in the Chamber, the right-wing cartel (the Poli) would 
have achieved the absolute majority of the seats even in the Senate.
3 However, this result is the algebraic sum of the over-representation of the PDS and of RC and of 
the under-representation of the other lists of the left. Four left-wing party-lists (Rete, Verdi, PS, AD) 
have failed to overcome the 4% threshold in the Chamber, wasting altogether about 8% of the PR 
votes. This fact has determined a loss of proportional seats for the Progressisti in the Chamber and, 
therefore, it accounts for their different performance in the two branches. For an evaluation of the 
specific weight of the left wasted vote on the distribution of proportional seats see Chiaramonte 
(1995). The conclusion is, however, that the effect was limited and non decisive because some of the 
seats lost by the small left-wing parties went anyway to the PDS and to RC.
4 In the choice of these areas we have made reference to the old political traditions of the red-belt 
regions. From the North we have excluded Emilia-Romagna. The Centre is the traditional area of 
strong local rooting of the left (Emilia-Romagna. Toscana, Marche, Umbria). The South includes all 
other regions. Within these three area important differences exist. In the North, in some zones of 
Piemonte and of Liguria the left fares far better than in the rest of the area. In the Centre, in some 
districts of Emilia Romagna and of Marche the electoral competition is relatively balanced. In the 
South, Sicily stands out from the other regions for its strong support to the right. On the whole, 
however, the differences among the areas have in these elections a relevance far greater than the 
differences within each area due to the amplifying effect of the plurality formula. For an analysis of 
these elections in terms of geo-political maps see Natale (1994) and Diamanti (1994).
5 In this analysis we have not considered a factor often suggested as an explanation of the 
differences between the Chamber and the Senate; the vote of the young electors. Due to the different 
age qualifications for voting in the two chambers (18 and 25 years respectively) the electoral body of 
the lower chamber is considerably larger. The difference, which in these elections amounted to 
roughly 5 millions of valid votes, is likely to be made up by young voters between 18 and 25. The 
hypothesis that this factor be responsible of the worse performance of the left in the Chamber has 
been advanced in the aftermath of the elections, making reference to both vote differences and 
survey results. However, survey results are somehow contradictory, and the validity of conclusion 
drown on the basis of vote differences between the two branches is questionable. With this latter 
method one can reach conclusions contrary to those fore mentioned. For instance, one could 
underline that the Progressisti candidates obtain a global percentage of votes which is actually 
identical in the Chamber and in the Senate (32.8 versus 32.9). Moreover, the left lists obtain in the 
Chamber 34.3% of the votes, that is more than the left candidates in the Senate. Our opinion is that 
this factor has played a role that can not be easily detected and which was anyway rather modest. 6
6 If one looks at the plurality victories not only in terms of mean level but also in terms of the 
distribution of such level, the different performance of the Poli in the two branches is more evident. 
Only one senator of the Polo delle Libertà is elected with an absolute majority of votes, whereas 85 
deputies overcome the absolute majority threshold. The same is true for the Polo del Buon Governo; 
one senator against 28 deputies. For the Progressisti the difference is lower: 37 deputies elected with 
absolute majority as against 12 senators. As far as the victories obtained with less than 35% of the 
votes are concerned, the situation is reversed between Progressisti and the Poli: in the Chamber the 
Progressisti win the greatest part of their seats with less than 35% of the vote: 31 out of 59 as against 




























































































7 As a matter of fact the level of the threshold is influenced also by other factors. See D'Alimonte and 
Chiaramonte (1993). On how the threshold has actually functioned in these elections see 
Chiaramonte (1995).
8 A different explanation is offered by Agosta (1994 , pp. 24-25), who argues that the lower 
fragmentation of the candidacies in the Chamber was due to the availability of the list vote (the 
proportional one). His hypothesis is that the opportunity offered to minor parties to present lists in the 
proportional component, without being obliged to present also district candidates, has favoured the 
reduction of the number of candidacies in the Chamber. This hypothesis, however, neglects the 
existence of a 4% national threshold for the Chamber, which was a strong negative incentive 
precisely for minor and local parties and candidates.
7 The peripheral vote is always very high in the Senate compared to the Chamber: even in the North 
is about 9.5 % , but here the lead of the PL candidates is such that it does not make a difference on 
the final outcome of the elections in the districts.
10 A significant difference exists only for the Chamber Southern districts. However, this is probably 
due to the division of the right in several Southern districts, which produces a lower concentration of 
the vote over the first two placed candidates.
11 In the Senate the residual vote is high, but is always high and for all kind of candidates. One could 
imagine that this vote is predominantly moderate and right-wing oriented and that it has weakened the 
candidates of the Poli lowering the winning threshold to the advantage of the Progressisti. However, 
no sufficient evidence is as yet available on this point.
12 This is confirmed by the study of the mean vote for candidates of the different cartels in the three 
geographical areas. The Progressisti obtain on average 23% of the votes in the North (no major 
difference between Chamber and Senate), and about 30% in the South. These figures suggest the 
structural weakness of the left in the North which prevent it from profiting from the weakening of their 
adversaries of the Polo delle Liberia due to the dispersed vote. In the South, on the contrary, with 
30% of the vote and with a higher dispersed vote, the left manages to win a certain number of 
marginal districts.
u in the patter n. 4 the candidates are three because either a fourth candidate was absent, or, 
although being present, it did not matched the criteria of relevance for its inclusion into the pattern. 
These criteria are those described above for the definition of the peripheral vote.
14 It is reasonable to believe that the existence of a 4% national threshold for proportional 
representation into the Chamber has brought about strategic defections. There were voters which did 
not want to waste their vote for a list they deemed incapable of overcoming such threshold. Our 
opinion, however, is that in these elections this phenomenon was marginal. After the first learning 
experience, it is likely that in the future voters will be more aware of this constrain in their electoral 
choice.
15 For what concerns the assumptions underlying the analysis of the individual vote mobility which is 
hidden behind aggregate swings, our position is summed up in the pages of Chapter 2 in Bartolini and 
Mair (1990).
ll> In the case of the Indipendenti di Sinistra this has probably been a deliberate choice. On the 
contrary, in the case of the Rete, wrong expectations about the vote for this party in Sicily have 
played an important role. This vote turned out to be by far lower than in the recent past and lower 
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